This is a translation of the post by Alisher Taksanov originally published in the Russian language blog.

The Uzbek government has still not expressed any opinion on the situation in South Ossetia, despite the fact that several days have passed since a bloody conflict between Georgian and Russian troops began there. Although semi-official news portals, such as UzA and Press-Uz.Info, have covered president Islam Karimov’s meetings with the Chinese leader, as well as the Olympic Games in Beijing, they decided to keep silent about the conflict in the Caucasus — definitely the top story in the world — as if nothing is happening there. This is yet another clear demonstration that there is no independent mass media in Uzbekistan.

Islam Karimov has not commented on the conflict yet, and seems to be in a difficult situation. On the one hand, he does not wish to enrage the Russian government, as Russia was the only country that supported Karimov after the bloody Andijan events of 2005, and has protected the case from international investigation. Karimov clearly realizes that the Uzbek government owes Russia and cannot answer in a critical way. This time, Russia would probably be rather severe and strict: it won’t let Uzbekistan to make fun of it again. Karimov also clearly realizes that there are separatist tendencies in Karakalpakstan, and as a republic, but being in state structure of Uzbekistan, Karakalpakstan has a constitutional basis for separation. It is a very interesting situation: officially, Uzbekistan is considered to be a unitary state, but at the same time it has Karakalpakstan, with its constitution, government, and parliament, which obviously suggests that Uzbekistan is a federal state.

Russia, should it become angry at Uzbekistan, could support separatist tendencies in Karakalpakstan, which would be quite an unwelcome outcome for Karimov. Practically, after Karakalpakstan, Russian could support the separation of the Khorezm and area, Samarkand, Bukhara, Navoi and Dzhizak regions, and finally the Fergana Valley. At the end, Uzbekistan could be broken up into a number of small principalities.

It is quite probable that events in Serbia, when the European countries recognized independence of Kosovo, could become the forerunner for recognition of the independence of other non-recognized states, such as Transnistria (in Moldova), South Ossetia (in Georgia) and Abkhazia (also in Georgia). Russia, being the superpower and main external political player in the region, could promote this via political and other means. After all, these territories are already independent states, although legally the world community admits them as parts of other countries. The parade of sovereignties might follow with Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet (all claimed by China), Kurdistan (distributed between Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey), etc.

However, if he supports Russia in its operations in South Ossetia, Islam Karimov will demonstrate to the rest of the world that it is at the service of Moscow; that it has no opinion of its own. This would enable the Uzbek government to get actively involved in the CIS and the CSTO. Though lately, Karimov’s behavior doesn’t evidence aspirations to actively participate in these organizations.

On the other hand, Islam Karimov does want to play against Georgia — although Karimov dislikes Saakashvili, as the latter came to power through opposition, and Karimov hates any kind of opposition (he certainly has the same feelings towards Victor Yushchenko and Kurmanbek Bakiev). This hatred was the reason Uzbekistan left GUUAM in 2005.

However, today things have changed in world politics. The fact is that Micheil Saakashvilli is backed up by the USA and the Western European countries, and it is clear that the game being played here is one for serious players. Islam Karimov does not wish to strain relations with the “giants” of world politics. The problem is that Uzbekistan does not have a well-conceived strategy vis-a-vis the world community. There are no reference points and no action program. All of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy is based on Islam Karimov’s personal preferences: enemies are those whom he personally does not like; friends are those with whom he is in friendly terms. The country’s interests are subordinated to his personal interests, and are at least 90% formed based on them.

In this case, it is not surprising that Islam Karimov is silent. Even if he makes a comment on the conflict in South Ossetia, it will not be clear statements, but rather unclear phrases, like “it is necessary to stop bloodshed,” “intervention of Security Council of the United Nations is required,” or “diplomatic measures should be taken to reconcile the dispute.” Islam Karimov is too smart to speak about the guilty side of the conflict. All he wants is to remain in power without any problems with great powers. After all, Uzbeks say that “a short tongue has a long life.”