What follows is one part of a cross-blog initiative that commemorates the 1991 Moscow coup and evaluates the years in between.

Introduction

Created during the National Delimitation of 1924 Uzbekistan had become by 1991 one of the most important single-industry (cotton) republican economies in the USSR. The capital Tashkent was one of the largest Soviet cities and in many the ways the Uzbek SSR epitomised the success of Soviet policies ranging from language reform to industrialized agriculture.

However, as elsewhere in the the USSR, problems manifested themselves which characterized the underlying faults of the Soviet command-control economic system and the CPSU’s monopoly of power: corruption (’the cotton affair’), environmental degradation (dessication of the Aral Sea), and ethnic friction (riots in the Fergana region in 1989).

Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost impacted upon the region as new political parties and protest groups exercised their new-found freedoms. However, as elsewhere in the USSR, Uzbekistan was caught unawares by the events in Moscow in August 1991 and, unlike the Baltic republics, there was little enthusiasm for independence.

From an outsider’s perspective, in the 15 years since independence it appears that Uzbekistan’s leadership has retained aspects of Soviet authoritarianism because of fears of the ‘unknown’, whether they be militant Islamists or Western NGOs. The communist notion of the command-control economy, with its overtones of constant government interference and concentration of economic power in the hands of the rulers, still holds strong. I am reminded of a line from that wonderful novel of the Risorgimento, Il Gattopardo (’The Leopard’), by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa:

‘Unless we ourselves take a hand now, they’ll foist a republic on us. If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change. D’you understand?’

Perestroika & Glasnost

The ‘cotton affair’ epitomised the attitude of many Soviet citizens towards Uzbeks. Whilst corruption was endemic in other republics as well, notably Azerbaijan and Ukraine, Uzbeks were regarded as a class apart. Unfairly, they seemed to have been classified as the ‘Sicilians’ of the USSR.

The effect of the ‘cotton affair’, by which cotton production figures were inflated for Moscow’s edification and the profits creamed-off by the elite surrounding Sharaf Rashidov, was that Uzbekistan was subject to special anti-corruption measures by Yuri Andropov (1982-84) and his successor-but-one (and protege) Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-91).

Islom Karimov was one beneficiary of perestroika : he was appointed First Secretary of the CPUz in 1989 and then became President of the Uzbek SSR the following year. So far, so normal. However, Karimov had been closely associated with the by now deceased Rashidov who, within a few years of his death in 1983, had become rehabilitated as a proto-Uzbek nationalist icon.

As in the rest of the USSR new political parties and protest groups emerged. Birlik (Unity) was (is) perhaps the best known, founded by Muhammad Salih and others in 1989; Salih also had a hand in founding the other perestroika-era opposition party, Erk. In the religious sphere, Islamic organisation was on the increase outside of the ‘official’ Islam represented by the Tashkent-based Muslim Spiritual Board of Central Asia.

The Coup & its Aftermath

The Moscow coup attempt of 18-21 August 1991 caught many unawares, and Karimov refrained from condemning the coup plotters until it became clear that their plan had failed. In retrospect it’s easy to condemn Karimov for his reticence ; however, he was probably simply waiting to see which way the wind was blowing before making any public pronouncements. Moreover, it should be noted that the attempted coup was not unprecedented - Chernenko had become Soviet leader in just such a way following machinations beside Andropov’s deathbed, the effect being to postpone Gorbachev’s coronation for a year.

On 31 August the Uzbek SSR declared its independence and from 1st September was known as the Republic of Uzbekistan; it joined the Commmonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on 21 December. Karimov was elected President of the new republic on 29 December, winning 86% of the vote in elections widely regarded as fixed - Muhammad Salih was the only other serious contender.

Someone acting as Devil’s Advocate would point out that everywhere else in the USSR there was little change in leadership during the transition to independence, and that Uzbekistan was not unique - in any case, why not vote for the person who already had leadership experience, especially during and difficlut times? it is this last point, that Uzbekistan (and other Central Asian states) are still ‘transitional’ states, that is used to justify continuance of authoritarian government.

Independence

In neighbouring Tajikistan, and the former Yugoslavia, the fall of communism had presaged civil war but for for reasons unique to those societies. However, the threat of instability is often cited as reason for restricted political activity and tightly-controlled media - virtually returning these spheres to a pre-perestroika and pre-glasnost state of mind.

At the same time the construction of a new national identity has turned against the Soviet legacy: there is now a ‘Museum of the Victims of Repression’ in Tashkent which recounts the crimes committed under Soviet rule, from the Great Purge to the ‘cotton affair’. The deaths of inter alia Akmal Ikramov and Faizulla Khojayev have been glorified as crimes against the Uzbek people, rather than as ‘merely’ victims of Stalin’s psychotic paranoia.

Yet so much analysis of independent Uzbekistan focuses more on the State and less on the people. As elsewhere in the world, whilst few people are defensive of the government they are extremely defensive of what they perceive as unfair or unjust criticism about their country. Uzbeks are undeniably proud of their country, if not their government.

Perhaps the cleverest defence of the Uzbekistan government is that it always acts in the best interests of the country and people. Every government likes to think this is the case, yet the ‘threat’ of instability caused by, say, economic upheaval or radical Islamism is used to justify tight control of the conomy and crasskdowns on Islamic fringe groups. To aid this, arguments are made that a) Uzbeks have always had a collectivist mentality, and b) Islam has always been state-sponsored.

Conclusion

The more obvious negative aspects of the Soviet legacy are the dessication of the Aral Sea and the cotton monoculture. Less obvious, but perhaps worthy of greater attention, is the continuance of Soviet forms of government and political attitudes.

The scholar Albert Hourani wrote a wonderful article entitled ‘Ottoman Reform and the Politics of the Notables’, in which he drew connections between the Ottoman tanzimat (refoms) of the 19th Century, local elites and the modern Middle Eastern states. Very simply, those who had benefited from the reforms became the first generation of nationalists and were able to extend their own pre-eminence under the old regime into the independent era.

Similarly, in Uzbekistan the former Soviet apparatchiks have reinvented themselves as proud and modern nationalists. If we want things to stay as they are …