Politics and Religion in Uzbekistan
What follows is one part of a cross-blog initiative, which takes the role of Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus as its central theme:
Uzbekistan is historically part of what Marshall G. S. Hodgson termed “the Islamicate”, or what lay Muslims would call “Dar al-Islam” (Abode of Peace). Within the Dar al-Islam, Uzbekistan falls within the Perso-Turkic sphere, characterized by dynasties such as the Seljuks, Mongols and Timurids, and scholars and poets such as Al-Kwarazmi, Omar Khayyam, Rumi, Mir Ali Sher Navoi et al. By and large, scholars have emphasized the predominance of the Hanafi school of Sunni interpretation, and the prevalance of sufi orders like Qodriya and Naqshbandi, to illustrate the region’s perceived liberal Islamic credentials.
However, in the years since 9/11, the increased geopolitical importance of Central Asia has caused a shift in the focus of analysis on the region’s religious affairs, away from mainstream Islam and towards political Islamism, because the assumption is that Islamic extremists in Central Asia are hellbent on seizing power and establishing an Islamic state. This shift in analysis is problematic because suddenly traditional aspects of the region’s Islamic nature, such as social support networks, lately epitomised by Akromiyya in Andijan, are being reinterpreted as fundamentalist and therefore dangerous to the status quo.
At the same time, Uzbekistan’s religious character has re-emerged from the shadows of Soviet rule. Islam survived, in a private and concealed form (much like the Shi’ite concept of taqiyya, lit. “silence”) the Stalinist hujm and later official appropriation, and so it must be galling for Uzbeks re-embracing Islam to be labelled “fanatical”, “fundamentalist” or “terrorist”.
Indeed, official attitudes towards Islam seem to mirror Russian attitudes towards religion. Russian Orthodoxy is regarded by some as the essence of Rus (“the Third Rome”), intertwined with government and the nation, and some of this concept seems to have been adopted by the government in Tashkent in its dealings with Islam, namely that it is the business of the government to regulate and control a country’s religion (and yes, I am aware as a Brit of the irony of pontificating on state religion …)
The threat of Islamic extremism is often cited as a reason for state control of religion. Recently, the Vice-Principal of Tashkent Islamic University, Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansurov, has argued that the Islamist threat has multiplied since independence:
“While religious radicals became active in Muslim states in the 1980s, Uzbekistan became a target of aggressive political encroachments of various fundamentalist groups acting under Islamic slogans only after proclaiming independence.
“Before the 1990s many people in Uzbekistan had no idea about the existence of radical religious movements in the Muslim world.”
Such views smack of the politics of fear or, to quote a recent BBC documentary series, the power of nightmares. In medieval Europe “extraordinary” circumstances (e.g. threat of invasion) were cited to justify arbitrary monarchical rule and the imposition of heavy and unpopular taxation. (In the case of England, this eventually led to Civil War and the execution of Charles I.)
President Karimov has been visiting Russia, and has been irked by media questions about the events of 13 May 2005. In reply to one doubtlessly impudent journalist, he snapped:
“We know better than you what happened in Andijan.”
The government’s attempt to control the message about Andijan is clear, and mostly the blame is being pinned on Akromiyya, and by default non-state religion; but Andijan was about many other things as well: law, politics, economics … The issue of radical Islam is a cul-de-sac.
on May 19th, 2006 at 1:51 am
A bunch of your links aren’t working. It looks like you missed the href part of the tag.
on May 19th, 2006 at 10:13 am
This is on another Uzbekistan-related topic– check out this news from Sweden, which is where I live. “Sweden: Uzbek dissident’s arrest sign of failed EU policy.” http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/05/18/sweden13408.htm
Great initiative, by the way. I just found this web site, but I’m very interested in human rights in Central Asia (and China), so I will check in repeatedly!
on May 19th, 2006 at 11:14 am
Ok, problem should be resolved … unfortunately, I can’t solve the problem of there being no satisfactory precis of the work of the great Hodgson anwhere on the WWW.
on May 19th, 2006 at 7:31 pm
I don’t understand what seems to be happening to NewEurasia.net. Are you guys now officially pro-Islamist? I don’t believe that Uzbekistan–or the other Central Asian republics of the USSR, for that matter–were within Dar-Al-Islam from the Bolshevik Revolution onwards. They were officially secular. Why should they go back to the middle ages? Have you followed what is happening in Iran these days? Is that really what you want for Central Asia?
on May 19th, 2006 at 9:27 pm
Did you read the whole article? see my last sentence:
Anyway, what’s Iran got to do with the price of fish?
on May 19th, 2006 at 9:34 pm
… Furthermore, there is also a whole world of difference between official secularism and popular religion. My point was that Islam survived Bolshevik atheism and, yes, does appear to be reviving, but not purely in the form of the fanatical Islam that gives people the willies.
In any case, there are many muslims who believe that Uzbekistan is part of the Dar al-Islam in the present, regardless of that country’s constitution, just as Turkey is considered part of the Dar al-Islam.
on May 19th, 2006 at 10:52 pm
Who are these “many Muslims,” precisely? How many of them are there? And How representative are they of the larger population? Who elected them? Who pays them? And why does what they claim mean more than what the majority of ordinary citizens believe, as shown by polls throughout the former Soviet Union that indicate the USSR was a lot more popular in Central Asia than Dar-al-Islam?
on May 20th, 2006 at 12:30 am
i.e. Muslims in Uzbekistan constitute a nutty minority. That’s what you mean, right?
on May 20th, 2006 at 1:30 pm
Of course the vast majority of the Uzbek population are Muslim–and almost all polling shows that most of them preferred the USSR to Dar-al-Islam, and oppose Sha’aria or an Islamic state. I think if you look at empirical evidence, such as polling data, emigration patterns (Russia preferred to Saudi Arabia, for example), instead of Islamist propaganda, you will realize that Islamist may have greater support among Western academics, journalists and NGOs than among the population of Central Asia.
on May 20th, 2006 at 10:02 pm
What “Islamist propaganda”? what’s that got to do with the price of fish?
on May 21st, 2006 at 2:07 am
Laurence, just for the record, since neweurasia is a collection of individuals, it would be pretty infeasible to have an official position, even if we strove for one.
on May 21st, 2006 at 6:16 pm
I just have to point out that comparing emigration statistics to Russia vs. Saudi Arabia wouldn’t be very telling anyway. After all, the pragmatic connections between Russia and Central Asia(such as that many Central Asians speak Russian, not Arabic) have to be considered. People tend to emigrate according to pragmatic factors, when possible and when emigration is attractive/necessary.
on May 22nd, 2006 at 3:28 pm
Nick - great article, thank you.
on May 25th, 2006 at 1:04 pm
“Are you guys now officially pro-Islamist? (…) Why should they go back to the middle ages? Have you followed what is happening in Iran these days? Is that really what you want for Central Asia?”
Look Laurence, we know who you are and what your sympathies are. Fine, nothing personal, this is your democratic right. Yet I think that an intellectual like you should come up with something better than to parrot primal karimovist rethoric - don’t you think so?
BTW, speaking of the ‘middle ages’: say what you want but the living standards of the average Iranian is far better than that of the average Uzbek. So is the one of the average Turk, Indonesian or Jordanian, countries with secular governments but socially ‘more Muslim’ than Uzbekistan with its anti-Islamic regime.
“and almost all polling shows that most of them preferred the USSR to Dar-al-Islam, and oppose Sha’aria or an Islamic state. I think if you look at empirical evidence, such as polling data, emigration patterns (Russia preferred to Saudi Arabia, for example), instead of Islamist propaganda”
I think several of us would be interested in some links or bibliographic references of the polls you refer to (who conducted them; who paid them; are they representative for society; etc.).
OK that said, what the ‘emprical data’ qouted by you suggest is true. Those who have lived in the region or seriously travelled it do not need polls or ‘Islamist propaganda’ to know that.
When you speak to the people, the standard refrain among many +35 years olds is ‘oi, kogda Soyuz byla…’ It’s understandable. People do not really miss the totalitarian dictatorship, the economic inefficiency and the Russian chauvinism-colonialism that were core characteristics of the
Soviet Union. They do miss the social security and other social advantages that the Soviet system brought.
What came after the Soviets is not necessarily brilliant, to say the least. Nostalgia for the USSR’s more positive achievements does not means, and often means not, that the very same people are *anti-Islam*
(as different from Islami*s*m and Sharia law). In fact, several Soviet nostalgics I know are in favor of more Islam in social life if that gives people a new dignity. What can be wrong with that? What do you offer?
As real, I think, is, that the Soviet system, despite its advantages, failed and that it is dead as a concept for the future. So are regimes that continue to rule with a Soviet mindset. Sooner or later they will collapse.
Regarding migration patterns: what we have with Central Asian and Muslim Caucasian in Russia is a typical post-colonial situation comparable with that of the many migrants from, say, Pakistan and Bangladesh in the UK. Celia is right on when she mentions the continuing dominance of the
ex-colonial lingua franca (Russian and English in these cases) in the process. That has not necessarily something to do with ideological sympathies for Russia but more with a) economic opportunities and b) the relatively freer climate in Russia compared to that in its southern
ex-colonies.
Finally, if polls and studies suggest that the vast majority of ex-Soviet Muslims are not receptive for an Islamic state and ‘extremist’ groups (as you suggest and which I believe also), what is the point of clinging to that so-called ‘Islamic threat’? Even more: what is the reason for
the karimovist regime to continue to exist since exploiting that so-called ‘Islamic threat’ is its main way to legitimate itself?
on May 26th, 2006 at 6:08 pm
Ataman, the surveys I saw were the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes survey (I had to call them to get the Islamic fundamentalist data, for some reason they didn’t put it on their website, maybe it is up now). It matched what Dr. Johannes Linn reported in his recent UNDP report–and an IFES survey reported on at http://www.ifes.org/news_item.html?newsid=03_2006.
on May 26th, 2006 at 6:14 pm
BTW I agree with you 100 percent that “People do not really miss the totalitarian dictatorship, the economic inefficiency and the Russian chauvinism-colonialism that were core characteristics of the Soviet Union. They do miss the social security and other social advantages that the Soviet system brought.”
That is why I believe real economic growth needs to come first to Central Asia, so that a peaceful democracy–not violent chaos and gang warfare like in Iraq–can develop. If there’s plenty for everyone, it will be easier to divide the pie democratically. That’s why rich countries are more democratic–they can afford it, IMHO. After countries modernize, they tend to democratize…
BTW Iran was richer to start with than Uzbekistan, though it is poorer now than under the Shah.
on May 26th, 2006 at 6:23 pm
Laurence, that is exactly the argument made in Fareed Zakaria’s The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad - namely that once a country has become wealthy enough to sustain a prosperous, independent, entrepeneurial and educated middle-class, then that middle-class, (who bear the tax burden) will begin to demand, and get, the sorts of political and social freedoms enjoyed in all developed countries. In other words, prosperity first, democracy second. Of course, it all depends on there being economic reform in the foirst place …
on May 26th, 2006 at 10:59 pm
Nick, I indeed read Zakaria’s book–and should have credited him with the idea. I don’t claim it as my own. My apologies for not citing the author…
on May 30th, 2006 at 6:55 pm
“As real, I think, is, that the Soviet system, despite its advantages, failed and that it is dead as a concept for the future. So are regimes that continue to rule with a Soviet mindset. Sooner or later they will collapse.”
Of course that is a opinion of one who has had the pleasure of seeing things on the outside. Most Uzbeks haven’t traveled outside the former USSR to gain perspective. I think their only reference point is generally how things were pre-1991… and many look favorably to that past, IMO.
“That’s why rich countries are more democratic–they can afford it, IMHO. After countries modernize, they tend to democratize…”
Yes, but I think you can also look at it the other way arround. I have likewise read an analsys (the author slips my mind) that says that a stable democracy is a cause for economic growth. And if you look at, say Latin America, where the 3 most “developed democracies” (Uraguay, Chilie and Costa Rica) are also the nations that generally have the best economies and standards of living it can makes sense. Problem is that sucessful dictatorships depend on having a brilliant leader to keep things flowing - some countries have one, many do not. Uzbekistan does not, IMO.
on May 31st, 2006 at 11:30 am
Laurence:
Yes, I know that 2002 PEW survey which has Uzbekistan as a sample country for the Middle East/Central Asia.
I quickly went through it and saw one question related to militant Islam (Q55), i.e. suicide bombings being justified or not in defence of Islam. That, on itself, says little about the perception of Islam really. I mean, Islam is a ‘somewhat broader’ concept/subject than just suicide bombings, also for many ex-Soviet Muslims.
Also interesting to note is, that under Q35 (on the kind of influence of this or that groups on society), 69% of Uzbekistani apparently perceive religious leaders (now the question is: state or informal ones?–survey does not details) to be either ‘very good’ (20%) or ‘somewhat good’ (49%).
Indeed it would be interesting to have the more specific research on Islam that you mention.
(BTW, the same PEW survey was published in 2002 and mentions ‘overwhelming support for the war on terror in Uzbekistan’ (p. 5). Question is to what extent Irak, the Abu Graib scandal etc. have affected that.)
“That is why I believe real economic growth needs to come first to Central Asia, so that a peaceful democracy (…) If there’s plenty for everyone, it will be easier to divide the pie democratically.”
Nice theory, but like that so-called ‘Islamist threat’, the ‘first economic growth, then democratization’ mantra is another prime alibi of the Tashkent regime — and, IMHO, one that is as worn-out. I even doubt whether the Karimovs believe it themselves.
Sure they want economic growth. The question is, for the benefit of whom and what (not hard to guess
). In the regime’s and russianized urban elite’s psychology, the ‘average Abdulla’ in the province should simply not have any decent living standard; in their view, he should be at the service of the “elite”.
The Karimovs — at least junior — and part of their entourage know *very* well that increasing living standards among larger coats of society means increasing self-esteem and increasing ambitions among people. In that sense, sooner or later, larger groups will challenge (whether through a form of Islam or other political currents) the current neo-feudal elite’s and its cronies’ grip on the economy and that will be the end of it.
That is nothing new, it has happened in other countries, but in Uzbekistan’s case it is the ultimate nightmare for a regime whose sole aim is to cling to raw power.
It is also my impression that it is this lack of what we could call ‘economic democracy’ that is most resented by the Uzbekistani, much, much more than the absence of Western style political democracy or the closure of NGOs who often promote concepts that do not work.
As I’ve said before, that is the core element of the Tashkent regime’s anti-Islamic hysteria. It’s not doctrinal or ideological. It is because *in some parts of the country*, Islam (again: not necessarily Islam*ism* or ‘radicalism’) has become a bit of a cement and framework for socially mobile groups and entrepreneurs who could become the some sort of middle class that could challenge the regime’s position sooner or later.
Brian:
“Of course that is an opinion of one who has had the pleasure of seeing things on the outside.”
It is. So what? Does that changes anything to the fact that the Soviet system failed?
“I think their only reference point is generally how things were pre-1991… and many look favourably to that past, IMO.”
Brian, you basically repeat things I said before. Yes, sure, most ex-Soviet citizen’s main reference point is the pre-1991 period; on top of that, as I said, what came after 1991 was not necessarily brilliant: impoverishment, social decay, corruption and cleptocracy, ethnic wars, the shoddiest side of ‘westernization’, crappy Chinese goods, … — all felt as very humiliating.
I think we can agree that clinging to nostalgia for a Soviet failed system – one that has its advantages but failed/collapsed nonetheless – and remain stuck in the Soviet collapse trauma is no path for the future.
All this being said, we talk a lot among westerners *about* the Uzbeks and other ex-Soviets but what I miss here is the input/opinion of Uzbeks *themselves*. What do they think?
on May 31st, 2006 at 12:53 pm
“In reply to one doubtlessly impudent journalist, he snapped: ‘We know better than you what happened in Andijan.’”
Maybe others know better than him what will happen with him in a number of years: http://www.historyguide.org/europe/ceausescu.html
on May 31st, 2006 at 4:31 pm
Ataman,
I agree with you that a rising middle class may turn to Islam–it has happened in Turkey recently–but still believe in the end people who have something to lose are less likely to be tempted by extremes than people who have nothing to lose.
As far as Karimov goes, I don’t know that he really wants to keep his country poor and dependent just to keep “Abdulla” living in the kishlak. Millions of Abdulla’s have already moved to Russia, and its going to be hard to keep them on the farm after that. I’d argue that in fact it is the Islamists who want to keep Uzbekistan poor–that’s why the terrorism, to scare off investors, tourists, and so forth. They can’t win, so long as Russia and China are willing to support Karimov, but they can make a lot of trouble in the meantime. Also, it makes drug money and Saudi/Iranian subsidy more valuable if everyone else is poor. So actually I agree with your descriptions, but not the decision as to cause v. effect. If Karimov were gone tomorrow his successor would have the same geopolitical forces to deal with, and would enact similar policies. I don’t think it is personal. The Ceausescu case would be actually something in his support–he was overthrown by the Romanian Communist elite, not the Americans (unlike the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz “color revolutions”). They stayed in power, afterwards. So it points to any change coming from domestic Uzbek rather than foreign influences.
Which IMHO means Islam is not the solution, at least not for Uzbekistan. After all, even Hizb-ut-Tahrir was founded in British Palestine, and is headquartered in London today. You might consider that the West is merelyt using Islamism as a wedge to split Central Asia off from Russia, and could certainly find quotes from people like Zbigniew Brzezinski about the “arc of crisis” to back you up. (Given America’s history with the Taliban, it wouldn’t be a surprise.) In that case, curiously, the Islamists actually would be dupes of the neo-Imperialist West–which may be how Putin and Karimov see things, especially in light of American support for Chechen fighters to this day…
As far as the survey results, there are more that Pew didn’t put on the web, I don’t know why, but you can email them and they’ll send you a file. I don’t know what I did with mine, it was several years ago. I think they didn’t publicize them because they showed that Uzbekistan was not ripe for an Islamist revolution, and US policy has been to bring Islamists into governments in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.
on June 6th, 2006 at 2:28 pm
“As far as Karimov goes, I don’t know that he really wants to keep his country poor and dependent just to keep “Abdulla” living in the kishlak.”
I did not say that Karimov wants to keep the ‘average Abulla’ (or ‘average Vanya’ for that matter :smile:) specifically ‘on the farm’. I say that the system that he embodies wants to keep him poor and ignorant for the sake of his own regime’s survival.
“Also, it makes drug money and Saudi/Iranian subsidy more valuable if everyone else is poor.”
And don’t you think drug money is not valuable for the present regime, or, at least part of its cronies?
“They (the Islamists) can’t win, so long as Russia and China are willing to support Karimov, but they can make a lot of trouble in the meantime. (…) The Ceausescu case would be actually something in his support–he was overthrown by the Romanian Communist elite.”
We’re shifting to pure speculation now but IMO that the Ceaucescu scenario (a palace coup and localised social unrest in the province) is the most likely one.
Besides, after Andijan, Karimov went to whine on Russia’s lap; yet I think the present Russia-Karimov ‘friendship’ will only last until the moment that Karimov perceives Russia to be ‘meddling’ too much and things start to spoil again. It has happened before, and it will not last.
“but they (the Islamists) can make a lot of trouble in the meantime”
I think you over-estimate them, just like the Tashkent regime and the Russian security establishment and yellow press inflate the so-called ‘Islamist threat’ for political purposes.
I do not pretend that Uzbekistan and CA have no – potentially – violent fringe groups. I do pretend that both their influence and capacity are over-estimated. I mean, the clumsy IMU attacks of 1999 and 2000 speak volumes.
IMO, in the worst case, we’ll have an Islamist version of the left-wing terror in Europe in the ‘70s and ‘80s (Baader-Meinhoff, Action directe). Yes they blew up things. Yes they carried out a number of assassinations on military-industrial bigwigs. Yes, they, the right-wing boulevard press and right-wing politicians made a lot of noise. Yet could they destabilise/ dislocate society? No. Did the ‘working masses’, which went through an economic crisis at that time and with these groups pretended to represent, supported/followed them en masse? No.
“Which IMHO means Islam is not the solution, at least not for Uzbekistan. After all, even Hizb-ut-Tahrir was founded in British Palestine, and is headquartered in London today.”
Claiming that Uzbekistan’s choice is ‘between Karimov and the Taliban’ is as passé as it is preposterous.
I think I have sufficiently argued on this blog that an ‘Islamic state’ is neither desireable, nor feasible in Uzbekistan and any other ex-Soviet Muslim majority republic. On the *social level*, however, a suitable Eurasian form of Islam is the best alternative IMO to stagnating, futureless neo-Sovietism and shoddy, totally discredited ‘westernisation’.
on June 6th, 2006 at 3:19 pm
BWT, Laurence, I found this 2005 PEW survey:
“Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics
Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics”
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=248
Unfortunately, it does not features Uzbekistan or any other ex-Soviet Muslims for that matter. I have contacted them to ask if they did anything specific about the subject in ‘our’ region so let’s see what we get.
on June 7th, 2006 at 4:46 pm
Ataman, I agree with the basic points you make, as you know. BTW the 2005 Pew survey EXCLUDED Uzbekistan, I couldn’t believe it, I asked them why and they just said, we can’t survey everywhere.
I just have a different interpretation about the Islamist threat. You don’t need a big following to make a big impact–look at how a handful of men blew up the World Trade Center, or the London Underground. I agree the masses won’t follow–especially in Central Asia.
on June 7th, 2006 at 5:22 pm
I think youll find the Pew report excluded a lot of countries, incl. those with a) large minority or majority Muslim populations (all the ‘Stans, Syria), b) active Islamist terrorists (e.g. Egypt, Philippines, Chechnya, Uzbekistan), or c) Islamic-based forms of government and justice (Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states) ad infinitum.
Pew may very well have said ‘we can’t poll every country’, begging the question: on what basis were the polled countries selected? The clearest criteria, it seems to me, is that they wanted a a balnce of nominally ‘muslim’ and ‘non-muslim’ countries.
on June 7th, 2006 at 6:00 pm
“EXCLUDED Uzbekistan, I couldn’t believe it, I asked them why and they just said, we can’t survey everywhere.”
Yes it’s too bad. No of course they can’t poll every country. Yet I think that a representative sample of Muslim countries should include at least one ex-Soviet Muslim country (it can be Taj or Azerb yet Uzb is most associated with that so-called ‘Islamist threat’).
In an article in the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs in 2004 (for those interested, it’s here: http://www.poli-sci.utah.edu/~hy2453/ ) Hakan Yavuz argues that despite Islam’s common origins and core teachings, due to distinctive social geographies, history (incl. patterns of colonisation, migration, … ) and cultural factors, there are seven ‘zones of Islam’ within the Muslim world: the Arab ‘core’; Turkish; Shia-Persian; South Asian; Malay-Indonesian; African; and diaspora, esp. Muslims in the West.
IMO, one could add an eight one: the ex-Soviet/Eurasian zone which is historically quite close to the Turkish Hanafi-Sufi zone but was cut off from its during the Soviet years.
on June 7th, 2006 at 6:44 pm
Ataman, It sound like your research is interesting–developing a theory of Soviet Islam as an alternative to Wahabism?
on June 9th, 2006 at 4:33 pm
Yes I do. Not really a research, but based on my life and work experiences in the region, I concluded already in late 2001 that a suitable/Eurasian Islamic alternative could really do no harm to these societies (then, however, was a bit of an, ahem, ‘delicate’ moment to come out with that due to the ‘circumstances’ we all know).
“developing a theory of Soviet Islam as an alternative to Wahabism?”
It depends what do you understand under Wahabism. If you mean ‘Wahabism proper’ i.e. the puritanical form of Islam that is in power in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, then yes — even I think Wahabism has very few takers among ex-Soviet Muslims anyway.
Or do you use Wahabism in the sense the Tashkent regime, the Russian security establishment and the boulevard press do: as a common denominator for all Muslims who: a) are considered ‘too pious’ ; b) worship outside of the totally discredited, sycophantic ‘state Islam’ ; or/and c) are economically no vassals of one or another regime goon — even if the bulk of a), b) and c) have nothing to do with/even abhor ‘Wahabism proper’?
In that case, no, because I consider these people as victims, not as a threat.
I hope to publish something more specific on Eurasian Islam by the end of the month. Yet IMO some of the core characteristics of an Eurasian Islam are/will be: a) even if Arabic is the language of the Holy Quran and the Ummah, Eurasian Islam is an Islam of Muslims with Russian as their lingua franca; b) it is to have a strong social rather than formal religious character (I mean that it can/will be a normative-value framework for what there is as a middle class at least in some parts of CA; it can be the engine of social initiatives and a more suitable civil society than the one imported along Western models; etc.).
It may seem a lot of blabla theorising I know but no matter what: Islam will get the upper hand.
But still… what do our Central Asian friends think?